The Eleventh Amendment Bars Private Individuals from Suing State Employers for Money Damages under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act: \u3cem\u3eBoard of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett\u3c/em\u3e by Shinavski, Joan
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 40 Number 1 Article 8 
2001 
The Eleventh Amendment Bars Private Individuals from Suing 
State Employers for Money Damages under Title I of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act: Board of Trustees of the 
University of Alabama v. Garrett 
Joan Shinavski 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joan Shinavski, The Eleventh Amendment Bars Private Individuals from Suing State Employers for Money 
Damages under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Board of Trustees of the University of 
Alabama v. Garrett, 40 Duq. L. Rev. 161 (2001). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol40/iss1/8 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
The Eleventh Amendment Bars Private Individuals
from Suing State Employers for Money Damages
Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act:
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION - AMERICANS wiTH DISABILITIES ACT -
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY - The United States Supreme Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment bars private individuals from
suing their state employers for money damages under Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act; Congress acted outside the scope
of its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by
including state employers among those subject to the mandates of
the ADA.
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356 (2001)
In 1994, Patricia Garrett was diagnosed with breast cancer, and
embarked upon a treatment plan.' Garrett alleged that her
supervisor, upon learning of her medical condition, undertook a
campaign to remove Garrett from her position as Director of
Nursing, Women's Services/Neonatology at the University of
Alabama Hospital, even though Garrett had continued to perform
her required job duties.2 Due to the pressure from her supervisor to
accept a demotion, Garrett, advised by her doctor, took a leave of
absence to complete chemotherapy.3 At the conclusion of her
1. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Al. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 362 (2001). After being
diagnosed with breast cancer, Garrett underwent a lumpectomy, node removal, and biopsy,
and was referred for radiation treatment and chemotherapy. Respondents' Brief at 1, Garrett
(No. 99-1240).
2. Respondents' Brief at 2, Garrett (No. 99-1240). Garrett asserted that her direct
supervisor, Sabrina Shannon, was biased against "sick people" and maintained a policy of
removing them from her staff. Id. According to Garrett, after learning of her illness, Shannon
first attempted to convince Garrett to resign from her job or transfer to a lesser position. Id.
When Garrett failed to do so, Shannon resorted to more direct methods of coercion in her
efforts to remove Garrett. Id. The coercion included such actions as listing Garrett's job for
recruitment, locking her out of the computer system, and threatening Garrett with demotion
to a lesser job. Id.
3. Id. Garrett was entitled to the leave of absence under the Hospital's employment
policies. Id.
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chemotherapy regimen, Garrett returned to work, resuming her
position as Director of Nursing.4 Garrett contended that her
supervisor was reluctant to allow her to resume her position, and,
two weeks after her return to work, Garrett was informed that she
had to either accept a demotion to the nursing pool or resign from
her job; otherwise, her employment would be terminated.5 Given
those alternatives, Garrett accepted a transfer to a position as
Nurse Manager at a convalescent home, but suffered a significant
decrease in salary.
6
Garrett filed suit in federal district court against the Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama based upon the adverse
employment actions that the University of Alabama Hospital had
taken against her subsequent to the discovery of her disability.7
The case before the Supreme Court represented the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals' consolidation of Garrett's action with that
of Milton Ash.8 In 1997, Ash brought an action under the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") 9 against his employer, the
Alabama Department of Youth Services, for its failure to enforce its
no-smoking policy.10 Ash claimed that the smoke pervasive in his
work environment aggravated his severe chronic asthma, and
asserted that enforcement of the no-smoking policy constituted a
reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities
Act." In addition, Ash had sought another accommodation under
the ADA: that his employer ensure that the vehicles assigned for
his use were adequately maintained to prevent the emission of
carbon monoxide fumes into the passenger compartment, which
4. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 362. Garrett's supervisor tried to bar her from returning to
work, telling her that the employer did not want her back. Respondents' Brief at 2, Garrett
(No. 99-1240).
5. Respondents' Brief at 2, Garrett (No. 99-1240). After Garrett's supervisor told her
that the employer did not want her to return from her leave of absence, Garrett sought the
assistance of the Personnel Department. Id. With their intercession, Garrett was returned to
her position, where she proved to be fully capable of fulfilling the job requirements. Id.
Nevertheless, the supervisor determined that Garrett had to be removed from her position.
Id.
6. Id. at 3.
7. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 362.
8. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 362-63.
9. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2001).
10. Respondents' Brief at 3-4, Garrett (No. 99-1240). Ash, who suffered from asthma
attacks that were so severe as to warrant hospitalization, worked in a confined area with his
smoking co-workers. Id.
11. Id. The ADA provides, in pertinent part, for the employer to make reasonable
accommodations for its employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12101. See infra note 38.
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would exacerbate his chronic asthma. 12
The defendant employers, both instrumentalities of the State of
Alabama, filed motions to dismiss on the basis of Eleventh
Amendment immunity.13 The district court responded by granting
summary judgment for the defendants, and, in an opinion that
addressed both cases, held that Congress had exceeded its
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it
allowed private individuals to recover money damages from state
employers under the ADA. 14
Garrett and Ash appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, which reversed the decision of the district court.15 In its
opinion, the circuit court relied upon its decision in Kimel v.
Florida Bd. of Regents,16  and held that Congress had the
constitutional authority to revoke the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity under the ADA.17
The State of Alabama appealed, and the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari to further delineate the boundaries of
congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 8 Specifically, the Court sought to resolve a split
among the courts of appeals by addressing the issue of whether an
employee may recover money damages due to a state employer's
failure to comply with Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990.19
12. Respondents' Brief at 3-4, Garrett (No. 99-1240). Ash asserts that his supervisor
failed to respond to these requests for accommodation, other than to tell Ash that he should
"just go ahead and quit,... just go home and draw disability." Id. at 4.
13. Garrett v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Al. in Birmingham, 989 F Supp. 1409, 1410
(N.D. Ala. 1998). The Eleventh Amendment reads: "The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI, § 1.
14. Id. at 1412. The text of Section 5 reads: "The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
15. Garrett v. Univ. of Al. at Birmingham Bd. of Trustees, 193 F3d at 1214, 1216 (11th
Cir. 1999).
16. 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 525 U.S. 1121, cert. dismissed, 528
U.S. 1184 (2000) (concluding that state employers cannot be sued for violations of the Age
Discrimination Act by virtue of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity).
17. Garrett; 193 F3d at 1218.
18. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363.
19. Id. In pertinent part, Title I of the ADA provides as follows:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
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In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that Congress had exceeded its
constitutional authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment when it abrogated the sovereign immunity of the states
by compelling state employers to abide by the provisions of the
ADA. 20 In rendering its decision, the Court effectively barred private
individuals from bringing lawsuits under Title I of the ADA to
recover money damages from their state employers.
21
The ADA enjoins employers, including state employers, from
engaging in discriminatory employment practices against a qualified
individual with a disability where the discrimination is based upon
that individual's disability.22 The Eleventh Amendment immunity
clause bars suits against a state by citizens of another state, and
the Supreme Court has further expanded Eleventh Amendment
immunity to prohibit actions against the state by its own citizens.2
3
However, the Court has acknowledged that Congress may
invalidate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when the
following two requirements are satisfied: (1) Congress manifestly
intends to cancel the States' immunity; and (2) Congress acts
pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.24 In the case at
bar, the Court found that the first prerequisite was not at issue.
25
Then, turning to the second prong of the analysis, the Court
determined whether Congress exceeded its constitutional authority
by subjecting the States to federal court suits for money damages
under the ADA.
26
Congress has the constitutional authority to make nonconsenting
states subject to actions in federal court, provided that it does so
as a legitimate application of the powers granted to it by Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 27 Therefore, the Court concluded
that the ADA must be appropriate Section 5 legislation to apply to
the states and abrogate their sovereign immunity from suits by
private individuals.28  The Fourteenth Amendment's Section 5
20. Id. at 374.
21. Id.
22. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
23. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363. See supra note 13.
24. Id. (citing Kimel, 528 U.S. at 62).
25. Id. at 363-64. The intention of Congress to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity
was expressly stated within the text of the ADA: "A State shall not be immune under the
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in [a] Federal
or State Court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter." Id. (citing the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12202).
26. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364.
27. Id. See supra note 14.
28. Id. at 364.
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permits Congress to enforce the Equal Protection guarantees within
Section 1 of the Amendment through the enactment of legislation. 29
Reviewing prior decisions governing the application of Section 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment to disabled individuals, Chief Justice
Rehnquist relied upon the result of the Court's use of a rational
basis test in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.a° He
determined that the Equal Protection Clause does not require states
to make special accommodations as long as state actions directed
at the disabled are rationally related to legitimate governmental
purposes.
31
Chief Justice Rehnquist also concluded that Congress' Section 5
authority is rightly exercised only to remedy state misconduct;
therefore, the Court must determine whether Congress' enactment
of the ADA was in response to an identified history and pattern of
unconstitutional employment discrimination by the States against
the disabled.3 2 The majority found that the legislative record of the
ADA failed to demonstrate that Congress identified a pattern of
irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled.33
Congress' general finding of historical discrimination against
individuals with disabilities was insufficient, as the great majority
of the recorded instances of discrimination assembled in the ADA:s
Congressional record did not concern the activities of the States.34
The majority reaffirmed that the Court, not Congress, is vested
with the authority to delineate the substantive guarantees embodied
29. Id. at 365. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment confers substantive guarantees,
as follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See supra note 14.
30. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365-66 (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S.
432 (1985)).
31. Id. at 367.
32. Id. at 368.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 369. Justice Rehnquist noted that the cited incidents of state action against
the disabled fall "far short" of the required pattern of discriminatory actions necessary to
sustain Section 5 legislation. Id. Rehnquist also contrasted the legislative history for the
ADA, containing scant evidence of state actions against the disabled, with the Voting Rights
Act, for which Congress assembled an extensive record of unconstitutional state actions. Id.
at 373.
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within the Constitution.35 Therefore, Section 5 legislation that
exceeds the definite guarantees of Section 1 must be congruent
with, and proportional to, the equal protection problem that
Congress identified.36 The Court held that the damage remedy
prescribed by the ADA is not "congruent" with and "proportional"
to the equal protection problem that Congress identified.
37
Specifically, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the ADKs
requirement for reasonable accommodation of disabled employees
and the Act's disparate impact standard, both of which impose
duties upon the states that surpass what is constitutionally required
under the rational review standard.38
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy noted that the plaintiffs
established no violation of the Equal Protection clause because
insufficient judicial documentation could not demonstrate a pattern
of discrimination by the states in their official capacities. 39 He
further noted that the only issue at bar is the right of a private
individual to recover money damages from the states under the
ADA, not the Congressional right to require the states to act.
40
Dissenting, Justice Breyer observed that the majority's stern
criticism of Congress' utilization of its Section 5 power is
35. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365.
36. Id.
37. Id. (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)).
38. Id. at 372-73. The ADA requires "reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a.disability who is an
applicant or employee, unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer's business." ADA, 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(5)(A). The Act defines reasonable accommodation as possibly:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities;. and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work
schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment
or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training
materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other
similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
ADA, § 12111(9). Chief Justice Earl Warren defmed the rational review standard as follows:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in
enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The
constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed
to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their
laws result in some inequality.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
39. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy is joined by
Justice O'Connor in his concurrence. Id. at 374.
40. Id. at 376 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy appeared to distinguish
between the constitutional authority of Congress to compel states to act and its power to
subject the states to liability for money damages in suits brought by private individuals. Id.
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analogous to the Court's prior imposition of restraint upon
Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, an approach
which the Court has since rejected. 41  In Justice Breyer's
assessment, such a critical approach, which borders on strict
scrutiny, would be appropriate where legislation strikes at basic
liberties or discriminates against a specific gender or race.42 Justice
Breyer noted that the ADA, however, does neither, and therefore
should not be subject to the heightened level of review.43
In a series of recent cases leading up to Garrett, the Supreme
Court signaled a willingness to more closely scrutinize legislation in
which Congress impliedly or expressly acts to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity. 4 The legislation reviewed by the Court in each
of these cases subjected the states to liability to private individuals,
which contravened the sovereign immunity bestowed upon the
states by the Eleventh Amendment.45
The doctrine of state sovereign immunity originated in response
to Chisholm v. Georgia,46 in which the Supreme Court determined
that Article III of the Constitution grants a private individual, who
is a citizen of one state, the right to sue another state in federal
41. Id. at 387 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg joined in
Justice Breyer's dissent. Id. at 376.
42. Id. at 387 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
43. Id. Justice Breyer was troubled by the unjust effect of the differing standards of
scrutiny employed by the Court in these matters; namely, that a lesser standard, rational
basis, is applied to legislation that encumbers individuals with disabilities, while a stricter
standard of review is utilized for a statute that was designed to benefit disabled persons. Id.
at 388. He contrasted the minimal level of scrutiny applied in Cleburne, where the legislation
burdened individuals with disabilities with the standard of review utilized by the majority in
Garrett, where the legislation was designed to help disabled individuals. Id.
44. The Supreme Court has decided more actions concerning state sovereignty in the
last twenty-five years than in all of its previous history. See William A. Fletcher, The Eleventh
Amendment: Unfinished Business, 75 NOTRE DAME L REV. 843-44 (2000). In the last few
years, the Court has protected states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); the Patent and
Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. College Svgs. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act in Kimel v. Florida Bd. of.Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). Id.
45. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 44; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507; Florida
Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 627; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 62; and Garrett, 531 U.S. at 356.
46. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). Chisholn, acting in his capacity as executor of a South
Carolina testator's estate, sued the state of Georgia for damages, thereby presenting the
Court with the question of whether an individual may properly bring an action in assumpsit
against a sovereign state. Chisolm, 2 U.S. at 430. Georgia maintained that its sovereign status
rendered it immune from suit. Id. at 469-70. To the contrary, the Court held that the
Constitution's Article In, section 2 vested the Court with jurisdiction where a controversy
exists between a state and a citizen of another state. Id. at 430-31.
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court.4 7  State sovereign immunity was established - as a
constitutional principle in the Eleventh Amendment, which was
adopted in the wake of the controversial Chisholm decision.4
An examination of the text of the Eleventh Amendment reveals
that it specifically prohibits only federal diversity actions between a
citizen and a state.49 However, the scope of Eleventh Amendment
immunity was expanded by Hans v. Louisiana5° to also prohibit
federal question lawsuits against a state by its own citizens. In
Hans, the Court held that it would be illogical to conclude that, in
the enactment of the Eleventh Amendment, the states had intended
to absolve themselves of liability from actions brought by citizens
of other states, but not from suits brought by their own citizens.51
Subsequent to the Hans decision, the Court became exceedingly
deferential to the doctrine of state sovereign immunity, only twice
invalidating that immunity.52  In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,5 male
employees of the State of Connecticut filed suit under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, contending that the state's
retirement plan violated the Act by bestowing preferential
retirement benefits upon female employees.54 The district court
granted injunctive relief, but denied the plaintiffs money damages
on the basis that they were prohibited by the Eleventh
Amendment.55 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming in
47. Chisolm, 2 U.S. at 420.
48. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 720-21 (1999) (citing D. Currie, The Constitution in
Congress: The Federalist Period 1789-1801, at 196 (1997)). The Court in Alden provided an
extensive history of the origins of the Eleventh Amendment, with particular attention to the
furor which arose after the Court decided Chisholm. Id. at 720. See also Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (remarking upon the "shock of surprise throughout the country" that
resulted from the decision rendered in Chisholm). See supra note 13.
49. See supra note 13.
50. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Hans, a citizen of Louisiana, sought to recover damages from the
state of Louisiana arising from the state's failure to pay coupon interest on bonds it issued
pursuant to an enactment of the state legislature. Hans, 134 U.S. at 3. Hans contended that
the matter involved a federal question because the state's actions transgressed the Contracts
Clause of the Constitution. Id. Louisiana claimed that its Eleventh Amendment immunity
barred Hans from suing the state without its consent. Id. at 4. The Court, in a case of first
impression, held that a citizen may not bring an action against his own state, without the
state's consent, even where a federal question exists. Id. at 14-15.
51. Hans, 134 U.S. at 15.
52. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1
(1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66 (1996).
53. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
54. Id. at 448.
55. Id. at 450. In holding that money damages were barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, the district court also relied upon Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Id.
at 450.
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part and reversing in part, agreed with the district court that the
Eleventh Amendment prohibits awards of money damages against
the states.5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and rejected the
holding of the court of appeals.57 The Supreme Court specifically
decided whether Congress had authority under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to cancel the states' sovereign immunity.5
The Court's analysis was rooted in the concept that Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment specifically and unequivocally imposes
limitations upon state actions.59 Moreover, Section 5 expressly vests
Congress with the authority to enforce the substantive provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting "appropriate
legislation."60 Therefore, the Court concluded, legislation enforcing
the Fourteenth Amendment constitutes a permissible abrogation of
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.61 The Court specifically
reserved the question of whether the Civil Rights Act Title VII
provisions at issue qualified as legislation for the purpose of
enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, because the state officials
did not raise that claim.
62
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.62 is the second of the two cases
in which the Court upheld congressional abrogation of state
sovereign immunity from suits brought by individuals.M The issue
in Union Gas Co. concerned the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA7),
which was enacted pursuant to the powers of Congress under the
Commerce Clause; it authorized the recovery of monetary damages
from the "owner and operator" of a Superfund site.65 In this case,
the federal government embarked upon a program to clean up a
hazardous waste site, and then filed suit to recover costs from the
respondent corporation, which, together with its predecessors, had
been responsible for the deposits of the hazardous materials.6" The
56. Id. at 451. On the issue of attorneys' fees, the court of appeals reversed the district
court on the basis that such fees are permitted under Edelman. Id. See supra at note 55.
57. Id. at 447.
58. Id. at 448.
59. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 453. See supra note 29.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 456. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
62. Id. at 456 n.11.
63. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
64. See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text (discussing the first case in which
the Supreme Court upheld congressional legislation abrogating the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity).
65. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 5.
66. Id. at 6.
2001
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respondent filed a third-party complaint against the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, asserting that the state had liability under
CERCLA as an "owner or operator" of the site.67 In a plurality
decision, the Court concluded that, absent the power to make
states accountable for money damages, congressional power to
regulate interstate commerce would be incomplete6 8 Justice White,
although voting with the plurality, authored a separate opinion in
which he emphasized his belief that the plurality's rationale was
not logically founded.69 Not surprisingly, given the Court's lack of
consensus for the foundation of the decision reached in Union
Gas, the case was subsequently and expressly overruled by the
Court in Seminole Tribe.0
Beginning with Seminole Tribe, a five-member majority of the
Court acted decisively to strike down legislation that it determined
to be outside the scope of congressional authority under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.' In Seminole Tribe, the Court
considered the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA'), wherein
Congress imposed certain obligations upon the states in their
dealings with Indian tribes.72 More significantly, in the IGRA,
Congress furnished the tribes with the right to enforce the relevant
terms of the legislation through federal court actions against the
states.73 Unlike Garrett and its kin, which were rooted in legislative
enactments pursuant to Congress' enforcement powers under the
Fourteenth Amendment, Seminole Tribe involved a congressional
act passed under the Indian Commerce Clause.74 In reaching its
holding, the Court first determined that Congress, in the IGRA,
clearly and unmistakably expressed its intention to abrogate the
states' immunity.75 The Court then inquired whether the IGRA was
67. Id. (citing CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)).
68. Id. at 19-20.
69. Id. at 47 n.1. Justice White was troubled by the plurality's inability to recognize that
Congress had failed to manifestly declare its intention to abrogate the states' immunity in
CERCLA. Id. In Justice White's view, the plurality conveniently read CERCLA in conjunction
with a subsequent amendment to CERCLA to arrive at its holding. Id.
70. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 44 (1996).
71. Id. at 47. That five-member majority consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at 46.
72. Id. at 47.
73. Id.
74. Id. The Court determined that the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8,
cl. 3, did not grant Congress the authority to cancel the states' sovereign immunity. Id. at 47.
75. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 57. The Court found convincing evidence of Congress'
express intention to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in the Act's
provision for jurisdiction to lie in the federal district court system and in "numerous
references" to the State as the defendant in actions under IGRA. Id.
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enacted "pursuant to a valid exercise of power."76 Expressly
rejecting the uncertain reasoning of Union Gas,77 the Court
reaffirmed Eleventh Amendment immunity as an enduring principle
in the relationship between the states and the federal government,
and not one subject to abrogation by Congress without valid
authority for that abrogation.78
In its next term, the Court utilized City of Boerne v. Fores79 as a
vehicle for deciding the question left unresolved in the Fitzpatrick
decision.80 Specifically, in City of Boerne, the Court confronted
whether a congressional act constitutes appropriate legislation,
pursuant to Congress' enforcement power granted by Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.8' City of Boerne arose when the
Archbishop of San Antonio used the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act ("RFRA") to contest the City's denial of a building permit to a
Catholic church located in Boerne, Texas.8 2 The City denied the
permit by asserting that the denial was consonant with an
ordinance protecting historic districts, and that the proposed
construction would alter the unique historic character of the
neighborhood in which the Church was located.83 The Archbishop
countered that the denial of the permit constituted a violation of
the RFRA.8 The district court held that Congress had exceeded its
enforcement powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
by enacting the RFRA.s5 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit disagreed and determined that the RFRA was
constitutional.86 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address
the issue that Fitzpatrick left unanswered: when is a congressional
enactment appropriate Section 5 legislation for the purposes of
abrogating the states' sovereign immunity?
7
76. Id. at 57-58 (citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985)).
77. Id. at 72.
78. Id.
79. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
80. 427 U.S. at 456 n.11. In Fitzpatrick, the Court specifically noted that it had not
been presented with the question of whether the legislation was appropriate legislation
pursuant to Congress' Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. Id. See supra note 62 and
accompanying text. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
81. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511.
82. Id. at 512.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. The district court certified its order for interlocutory appeal, enabling the case
to proceed to the Court of Appeals. Id.
86. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512.




Congress had passed the RFRA to specifically countermand the
Court's decision in Department of Human Resources v. Smith,88
and to restore the Sherbert v. Vernere9 compelling governmental
interest test for the analysis of free exercise challenges 0 Writing
for the majority in City of Boerne, Justice Kennedy agreed that
Congress is empowered under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause to enact legislation to protect the constitutional
right to the free exercise of religion.91 However, he noted, the
powers of Congress under Section 5 extend only to the
enforcement of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, not
to assessing substantive guaranteed rights. 92 He emphatically
rejected the attempt by Congress to determine constitutionality,
reserving that right for the judicial branch: "Legislation which alters
the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be
enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional
right by changing what the right is. It has been given the power 'to
enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes a
constitutional violation."
93
To determine the propriety of the RFRA as remedial legislation
tailored to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Justice Kennedy expounded what is now referred to as a
congruence and proportionality test.9a Appropriate Section 5
legislation cannot create substantive rights; it must be remedial in
nature.95 It is within the scope of the Section 5 power vested in
Congress to enforce a right, he wrote, when there is "a congruence
and a proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end."96 If a congressional
enactment fails the congruence and proportionality test, then the
enactment is not enforcing a right, which is a valid exercise of
88. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (declaring that violating a law that proscribes acts which are
within the State's power to regulate may not be justified by the Free Exercise clause).
89. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the Free Exercise clause was violated when a
state denied unemployment compensation benefits to the plaintiff, a Seventh Day Adventist,
who had refused to work on her church's Sabbath).
90. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512, 515.
91. Id. at 519 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), for the
proposition that the fundamental liberty concept contained within the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment "embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.")
See supra note 29.
92. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 520.
96. Id.
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congressional authority, but rather is an inappropriate attempt to
substantively change the right, and thereby is an invalid use of
congressional power.1
7
Applied in City of Boerne, the congruence and proportionality
test revealed that congruence was absent in the legislative record's
failure to establish a modem history of persecution and religious
bigotry codified by state laws.98 More fatally for the RFRA, the
sweeping scope of the remedy prescribed by the statute was far
from proportional to the wrongs it was said to redress.9
Accordingly, the Court held that because the RFRA was not
appropriate legislation for the enforcement of Fourteenth
Amendment provisions, its abrogation of the states' sovereign
immunity was not a valid exercise of congressional power under
Section 5. 100
The Court revisited the congruence and proportionality test in
Florida Prepaid, and upheld its standards. 10 Florida Prepaid arose
after the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification
Act ("Patent Remedy Act") explicitly cancelled the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit. 1°2 At the time the Patent Remedy
Act was passed, a patent infringement action filed by College
Savings Bank against Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expenses Board was pending. 1°3 Relying upon the Patent Remedy
Act's amendment of the patent laws, College Savings pressed its
suit against Florida Prepaid, a Florida instrumentality. 104 The district
court denied Florida Prepaid's motion to dismiss, and, on appeal,
the circuit court found that Congress acted within the scope of its
Section 5 authority under the Fourteenth Amendment in abrogating
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.1 5 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari, and reversed the court of appeals, reaffirming
97. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519, 520.
98. Id. at 530.
99. Id. at 532.
100. Id.
101. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 627.
102. Id. at 630. The applicable section of the Patent Remedy Act provides as follows:
Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or
instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity, shall not be immune, under
the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any other
doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal Court by any person . . . for
infringement of a patent under section 271, or for any other violation under this title.
Id. (citing Patent Remedy Act, 35 U.S.C. § 296(a)).
103. Id. at 630-34.
104. Id. at 631.
105. Id. at 633-34.
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the standards it had established in Seminole Tribe and City of
Boerne. °6 The Court found it clear that Congress had expressly
intended to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity by passing the
Patent Remedy Act, and that Congress termed its actions "an
acceptable method of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment."107
Particularly, the Court concerned itself with whether the Act was
"appropriate" Section 5 legislation as defined in City of Boerne.'°8
To distinguish between legislation that is remedial in nature, and
therefore appropriate under Congress' Section 5 powers, and
legislation conferring substantive rights, and accordingly not within
Congress' Section 5 authority, the Court restated the congruence
and proportionality test as follows: "[F]or Congress to invoke § 5, it
must identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's
substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme to
remedying or preventing such conduct." °9 Applying this test to the
Patent Remedy Act, the Court again found that the legislation was
not appropriate because Congress had exceeded its authority under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. °10
In looking at the congruence arm of the test, the Court in
Florida Prepaid determined that the legislative history lacked
evidence of a pattern of patent infringements by the states.' In
fact, in passing the Act, Congress had failed to describe the
constitutional wrong that the Patent Remedy Act sought to
redress."' Because the Patent Remedy Act was not precisely
designed to remedy a pattern of state wrongs, it could not be a
proportionate remedy. 13  Having failed both prongs of the
congruence and proportionality test, the Court deemed the Patent
Remedy Act to be inappropriate Section 5 legislation."'
Returning to the issue of appropriate Section 5 legislation with
106. Id. at 634.
107. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 637 (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 637-38.
109. Id. at 639.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 640-43.
112. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640. The Court found that the Patent Remedy Act's
"apparent and more basic aims were to provide a uniform remedy for patent infringement
and to place States on the same footing as private parties under that regime." Id. at 64748.
The Act was designed to remedy patent infringement activities that did not amount to
unconstitutional wrongs, the Court noted. Id.
113. Id. at 647.
114. Id.
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Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents,115 the Court determined that,
despite the express intention of Congress, the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act ("ADEA") cannot apply to state employers by
virtue of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from lawsuits
by private individuals." 6 Again, as in City of Boerne and Florida
Prepaid, the Court reasoned that the enactment of the ADEA did
not represent appropriate legislative action under the Section 5
powers vested in Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment." 7
Garrett represents the natural extension of the philosophy the
Court applied in Kimel, as Garrett mirrored Kimel in several
important respects.1 8 First, in both Kimel and Garrett, it was clear
that Congress had unequivocally intended to abrogate the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity when it passed the ADEA and the
ADA, respectively. 19
Secondly, in Kimel, the majority found that under the Equal
Protection Clause, age, unlike race and gender, does not constitute
115. 115. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
116. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 62. Kimel represents the consolidation by the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals of three separate actions brought under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA') against state employers. Id. at 71. The first action, filed by
Roderick MacPherson and Marvin Narz against their employer, the University of Montevallo,
sought redress for the University's performance evaluation system, which had a disparate
impact on faculty members who were over the age of 40. Id. at 69. In the second suit, J.
Daniel Kimel, Jr., together with current and past employees of Florida State University (all of
whom were at least 40 years of age), sued the Florida Board of Regents due to its refusal to
fund market-based corrections to employee salaries, which had a detrimental effect on
primarily older employees. Id. at 70. In the final case, Wellington Dickson sought to recover
damages from the Florida Department of Corrections, his employer, because it denied him a
promotion based upon his age. Id. at 70-71. In its decision on the consolidated actions, the
court of appeals held that the states' sovereign immunity is not validly abrogated by the
ADEA Kimel, 528 U.S. at 71. The Court granted certiorari to resolve a split between the
United States Courts of Appeals on the validity of the ADEA's abrogation of the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit Id. at 72.
117. Id. at 67. The Court observed that, in contrast to gender and race, age does not
qualify as a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 83. Therefore, the
Court applying the more deferential rational review standard and determined that the ADEA,
with its sweeping prohibitions of "discrimination against any individual... because of such
individual's age" imposes remedial measures that are not in proportion to any Constitutional
wrong it could have targeted to correct. Id. at 86 (citing ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)). See
supra note 38.
118. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 62. See also Garrett, 531 U.S. at 356. See generally Gregory
T. Neugebauer, Ph.D., Recent Decision, A Federal Age Discrimination Remedy Violates State
Eleventh Amendment Immunity: Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 39 DUQ. L REV. 243
(2000). In his article, Neugebauer provides a detailed analysis of the Court's approach in the
Kimet case. Id.
119. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66. See also Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363-64. See supra notes
22-25, 115-17 and accompanying text.
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a suspect classification. 120 This finding is echoed in Garrett, in
which the Court reiterated that disability is not a suspect
classification under the Equal Protection Clause.
121
Lastly, in Kimel, as in Garrett, the Court held that Congress, by
subjecting state employers to the Act, had exceeded its Section 5
power because the ADEA failed the congruence and proportionality
test.122 Similarly, in Kimel, the Court observed that the legislative
history of the ADEA failed to disclose the pattern of discrimination
required for a valid exercise of Congress's enforcement powers
under the Fourteenth Amendment.' 23 Lacking an identified pattern
of constitutional violations to remedy, the ADEA failed the
congruence test. 24 More importantly, however, the Kimel Court
found that the broad scope of the ADEA imposed duties that are
not proportional to the wrongs the ADEA was presumably enacted
to redress.
25
The same five justices formed the majority in Seminole Tribe,
Florida Prepaid, Kimel, and Garrett.26 In each instance, the Court,
relying upon and further refining a line of Eleventh Amendment
immunity analysis, struck down the congressional enactment for
being outside the scope of the authority granted to Congress by
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court's application of the congruence and proportionality
test is targeted to balance two competing interests: the
120. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83. See supra note 117.
121. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366-67.
122. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82-83.
123. Id. at 89. The Court commented:
Our examination of the ADEA's legislative record confirms that Congress' 1974
extension of the Act to the States was an unwarranted response to a perhaps
inconsequential problem. Congress never identified any pattern of age discrimination
by the States, much less any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of
constitutional violation.
Id. at 89.
124. Id. at 91.
125. Id. at 86.
126. The five-member majority in each of those cases was comprised of Justices
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas. Seminole Thibe, 517 U.S. at 46; Florida
Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 629; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 65; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 960. The majority
opinion in City of Boerne, which also established principles employed in Eleventh
Amendment analysis, was authored by Justice Kennedy, who was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Thomas, Stevens, and Ginsburg, and, in part, by Justice Scalia. See
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 510. See supra notes 79-100 and accompanying text. City of
Boerne is distinguishable from the other four cases because it arose under a challenge to the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, and Justice Stevens had clear reservations that
the RFRA established preferential treatment for religion, which he held to be a violation of
the Establishment Clause. Id. at 536-37.
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constitutional right of the states to be immune from suits by
private individuals, and the constitutional rights of private
individuals as embodied in appropriate remedial legislation enacted
by Congress pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
powers.
Nevertheless, Justice Breyer's dissent in Garrett is exceedingly
persuasive. He argues that the Court is purporting to apply a
rational basis review, when, in fact, it is more strictly scrutinizing
the legislation: "Congress reasonably could have concluded that the
remedy before us constitutes an 'appropriate' way to enforce this
basic equal protection requirement. And that is all the Constitution
requires." 127 By applying its congruence and proportionality test,
with its detailed fact-finding and examination of the legislative
record, the Court is holding the legislation to a higher standard
than is required under a rational basis review. However, given the
current composition of the Court, it is not likely that Justice
Breyer's view will prevail in the near future.
The threshold inquiry in the Court's Eleventh Amendment
immunity analysis is whether Congress manifestly intended to
cancel the states' immunity. Accordingly, in future legislation,
Congress should expect to expressly state its intention to abrogate
the states' sovereign immunity. However, that express intention to
cancel the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states is, in and
of itself, not sufficient to subject the states to liability from private
suits.
For its future enactments to survive Eleventh Amendment
immunity challenges by the states, Congress must be certain that
the legislative history identifies a pattern of constitutional wrongs
that the legislation is tailored to remedy, and that the proposed
remedies are proportional to the violations they are targeted to
correct. As the Garrett Court's detailed analysis of the legislative
record for the ADA ilustrates,'12 fact-finding is essential to the
Court's analysis in these matters. Therefore, Congress must not
only make clear that it manifestly intends to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity, but it must also ensure that the legislative
record contains sufficient evidence of constitutional transgressions
by the states, which the legislation is specifically designed to
redress.
127. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 377 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See supra notes 41-43 and
accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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In the aftermath of Garrett, it should be remembered that state
employees are not left without recourse for employment-related
discrimination based upon the employees' disabilities. As the Court
pointed out in Kimel, state employees may still avail themselves of
any remedies provided by state statutes banning discrimination.12 9
Moreover, Garrett and the related sovereign immunity cases do
not necessarily spell the end of employment discrimination
protections for state employees.130 In a recent decision, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Equal Pay Act13' as
valid Section 5 legislation that enforces existing constitutional
rights. 32 In contrast, the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA')'3
was adjudged by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to be an invalid
exercise of Congress' Section 5 under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 134 Applying the congruence and proportionality test,
the court determined that the legislative record was without any
evidence of unconstitutional state actions that the FMLA was to
redress.135
With Garrett, the Court continues to reserve the authority to
define the rights contained within the Constitution. 36 Garrett
further reaffirms that the Court will hold Congress to a very high
standard when Congress seeks to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment immunity of the states from lawsuits by private
129. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91-92.
130. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (1997);
F/orida Prepaid, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); and Kimel, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
131. Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2001).
132. Hundtermark v. State of Fla. Dep't of Transp., 205 F.3d 1272, 1276-77 (lth Cir.
2000) (arising from the Florida's Department of Transportation's appeal of a district court
decision denying its motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs complaint brought under
the Equal Pay Act). Id. at 1274. The court determined that, in enacting the Equal Pay Act,
Congress had validly abrograted the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity because the
remedies were congruent and proportional to the injury (gender discrimination in pay) that
they were to designed to redress. Id. at 1276-77.
133. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2001).
134. Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F3d 519 (5th Cir. 2000) (commenting that the legislative
record was void of examples of unconstitutional discrimination by the states). The court
found no constitutional right to family and medical leave, and that, accordingly, the sweeping
remedies prescribed by the FMLA lacked congruence and proportionality to the injuries to
be corrected by the FMLAk Id. at 526, 529.
135. Id.
136. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 (citing City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-24). For nearly two
hundred years, the Court has protected its right to define the law. "It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the
rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws
conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each." Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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individuals.137
After Garrett, to prevail over an Eleventh Amendment challenge,
private individuals seeking to recover monetary damages from the
states must establish the following elements: that Congress
manifestly intended to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity, and
that the congressional enactment is appropriate remedial legislation
under the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers of
Congress. To be valid Section 5 legislation, the congressional act
under which the suit is brought must reflect a pattern of state
discriminatory conduct that violates the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the congressionally-imposed remedy must be congruent and
proportional to the identified violations it seeks to redress.13
Joan Shinavski
137. Id.
138. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374.
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